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The welfare of the child principle and the use of PGD: selecting for disability 
Sarah Elliston 
 
Introduction 
Campbell and Cabrera argue in this volume ‘that prospective parents should be free to 
take such steps as they think fit to have what they regard as healthy and capable 
children’, adding the caveat ‘provided this does not cause undeniable harm, to these 
children or to other people, which is sufficiently serious to outweigh the presumptive case 
for reproductive freedom’.1 Notions of parental freedom and harms to children will be 
explored in a more specific context in this chapter: that of preventing the use of embryos 
for treatment based on their genetic make-up.  
 
The enactment of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (HFEA 
2008) may be viewed as enhancing the scope for choice of those who wish to become 
parents through assisted reproduction in the UK, largely due to its provisions concerning 
the possibility of founding families outside the two parent heterosexual model and its 
minor revision of the welfare principle.2 The approach taken by the HFEA 2008 was to a 
considerable extent based on the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and 
Technology (HCSTC) report: Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law.3 This 
report had been criticised by some members of the Committee for having taken an 
‘extreme libertarian approach’, their dissenting views being reflected in a special report 
issued at the same time as the substantive report.4 However, in one area the HFEA 2008 
has taken a uniquely restrictive step. For the first time in the UK, legislation has sought to 
make it impermissible, at least in certain circumstances, to choose to try to have children 
1 See Chapter 2. 
2 Part 2 of the HFEA 2008, and s. 14(2), amending s. 13(5) of the HFEA 1990. 
3 Fifth Report of Session 2004–5, Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, vol. 1, 
HC 7–1, London: Stationery Office, 24 March 2005.  
4 HC 491, 24 March 2005. 
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that are known to have particular genetic constitutions. Testing of gamete donors may 
enable these kinds of decisions to be made before embryos are created and restrictions are 
imposed on preferential selection of donors where there is a significant risk of genetic 
abnormalities being passed on to children.5 However, the principal technique under 
consideration here will be prenatal genetic diagnosis (PGD), involving genetic testing of 
embryos.6 The idea that a state would involve itself through legal regulation in decisions 
about the genetic make-up of children and intrude on the reproductive choices of 
potential parents in this way raises troubling questions, despite the apparently beneficent 
motive of preventing children being born with potentially devastating genetic conditions. 
While concerns about the appropriate weight to be given to the welfare of children born 
through assisted reproductive technology were clearly prominent during the reviews of 
existing legislation and practice that led to the passage of the HFEA 2008, there was also 
a perceived need for clarity concerning when techniques such as PGD should be deemed 
to be acceptable and legally permissible.7 It will be argued here that if achieving clarity 
was a principal aim of the new legislative provisions, they may in fact fall short of 
achieving this goal. It will be suggested that they may provide some scope for 
interpretation that would allow potential parents who wished to do so to attempt to select 
embryos for disability, despite the legislative intent to the contrary. Even so, the retention 
of the general welfare principle in the amended HFEA 1990 may still render such 
attempts null and void, highlighting the need to consider the appropriateness of a child 
welfare test in this context. It also raises the issue of whether the new provisions serve 
any practical purpose, if the end result could have been achieved through use of the 
welfare principle. It will be concluded that their real effect is most likely to be in the 
message they may be perceived to send about the undesirability of having children with 
genetic disorders. 
5 Section 13(9) of the HFEA 1990, as amended. 
6 The history of the development of PGD and the current methods of performing it are 
discussed elsewhere in this volume. 
7 See for example, HCSTC, Fifth Report of Session 2004–5, Human Reproductive 
Technologies and the Law. Deleted: 
th 
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The HFEA 2008 amends in many significant ways the original statute regulating 
particular methods of medically assisting reproduction: The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 (HFEA 1990). Hereafter they will be referred to collectively as the 
HFE Acts,8 save when reference to a specific Act is necessary. The HFE Acts prohibit 
certain activities absolutely.9 Other specified activities can only be carried out with a 
licence issued by the Authority. The type of licence relevant to this discussion concerns 
activities in the course of providing treatment services.10 Performing such activities 
without a licence is a criminal offence carrying penalties of imprisonment up to ten years 
or a fine or both.11  
Schedule 2 of the amended HFEA 1990, specifies the kinds of activities that may 
be authorised under licence. Those critical to PGD are the following: 
 
(a) bringing about the creation of embryos in vitro, 
(b) procuring, keeping, testing or processing or distributing embryos,  
... 
(d) other practices designed to secure that embryos are in a suitable condition to 
be placed in a woman, 
(e) placing any permitted embryo in a woman 
 
The procedures undertaken in PGD are hence covered here: from the initial 
creation of in vitro embryos, to testing them and finally transferring them to a woman as 
part of treatment. 
 
Section 14 of the HFEA 2008 modifies the conditions of licences for treatment contained 
in s. 13 of the HFEA 1990 to include the following: 
8 For a comparison of the HFE Acts, see Birk, D. Human Fertilisation and Embryology: 
The New Law, Bristol: Jordan, 2009. 
9 Section 41 HFEA 1990, as amended, lists offences and penalties. 
10 Section 11(1)(a) and Schedule 2 HFEA 1990, as amended. 
11 Sections 4 and 41(2) HFEA 1990, as amended 
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(9) Persons or embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrion abnormality involving a significant risk that a person with 
the abnormality will have or develop— 
(a) a serious physical or mental disability, 
(b) a serious illness, or 
(c) any other serious medical condition, 
must not be preferred to those that are not known to have such an 
abnormality. 
 
Similar restrictions are placed where testing involves gender-related genetic 
disorders.12 These will not be discussed separately.  
 
On an initial reading, these provisions may seem to allow for no discretion in the 
use of embryos found to have an abnormality or to carry a risk of illness or disability, 
once a condition has passed the requirement of sufficient seriousness, and this threshold 
must be passed to allow PGD to take place at all.13 
 
In addition to these provisions, it is also important to note the general ‘child 
welfare’ principle which forms part of licence conditions. This must be considered in all 
treatment decisions governed by the HFE Acts: 
 
13(5) HFEA 1990, as amended  
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been 
taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment 
(including the need of that child for supportive parenting), and of any other child 
who may be affected by the birth. 
 
12 Sections 13 (10) and (11), HFEA 1990 as amended. 
13 Schedule 2 1ZA (2). 
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A failure to comply with the requirements of s.13 is not itself a criminal 
offence,14 unlike certain other practices prohibited by the HFE Acts, such as placing an 
embryo in a woman other than a permitted embryo.15 Nevertheless, although a breach of 
the standard licensing conditions in itself would not lead to prosecution, it could result in
the HFEA taking proceedings to suspend or revoke a clinic’s licence, so they are very 
likely to be observed.16 Effectively, the licensing conditions act as a legislative restric
on the choices of couples seeking treatment services governed by the HFE Acts by 
limiting the freedom of providers to offer such services. The HFEA’s regulatory ro
been reinforced by the introduction of a specific statutory duty upon it to promote 
compliance with the requirements of the HFE 1990 and with the Code of Practice it 
issues under section 25 of the HFE Acts.17 Its duties also now include maintaining a 
statement of the general principles which it considers should be followed in carrying o
its activities under the Act and its functions in relation to such activities.18 It has been 
suggested that ‘the Authority has always defined its general role by reference to its 
statutory remit. This new requirement is likely to produce a more detailed breakdown of 
its role in respect of particular and specific activiti
 
In order to examine the potential impact of the new s. 13 restrictions on treatment 
following embryo testing, it is useful to consider examples of how they might be applied. 
For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed that both gamete providers are intending to 
parent any child born as a result of the assisted reproduction service. 
 
The application of the new embryo-testing provisions  
14 Section 25(6) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
15 Section 3(2) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
16 Sections 18, 19 and 25 HFEA 1990, as amended. 
17 Section 8(1)(9cb) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
18 Section 8(1)(ca) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
19 Birk, Human Fertilisation and Embryology, para. 4.19. 
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 PGD results in a possible choice within a batch of embryos – couple does not wish to use 
an affected embryo 
 
In this example, the couple has a number of embryos in storage and is seeking to avoid a 
specific disorder which comes within the terms of being a condition that can be tested for 
using PGD. All of the embryos are tested, and the results show that only one of these 
embryos is affected. The couple chooses to avoid using the affected embryo.  
 
This is the most likely scenario to arise in practice. The vast majority of people 
who seek to use PGD will do so precisely to avoid particular genetic disorders due to a 
family history of a condition or increased risk of disorders, such as those associated with 
conception of children by older gamete providers. Should such a condition be detected in 
a particular embryo following PGD, their conclusion will almost inevitably be to reject 
this embryo for implantation in favour of one that does not have this condition. In such 
situations, there is no need to bring into play any of the new section 13 restrictions, as the 
potential parents’ preference is in line with them. 
 
However, matters may not be entirely simple even here. Schedule 2 of the HFEA 1990 as 
amended contains further provisions concerning activities which may be licensed, and 
added in embryo testing as one of these activities.20 Embryo testing can only be carried 
out for one or more specified purposes. These include establishing parenthood and tissue-
typing where a sibling suffers from a serious medical condition to enable selection of an 
embryo that could be a match for potential donation to the sibling. The purposes that are 
relevant here, though, are the provisions relating to testing for genetic abnormality.21  
 
Schedule 2 S1ZA 
(1)  
20 As amended by Schedule 2 of the HFEA 2008. 
21 Sex-related disorders are dealt with in Schedule 2 S1ZA (1)(c), HFEA 1990, as 
amended. 
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(a) establishing whether the embryo has a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion 
abnormality that may affect its capacity to result in a live birth, 
 
(b) in a case where there is a particular risk that the embryo may have any gene, 
chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality, establishing whether it has 
that abnormality or any other gene, chromosome or mitochondrion 
abnormality. 
 
      In addition, Schedule 2 1ZA (2) provides that a licence cannot be issued for embryo 
testing unless the Authority is satisfied ‘that there is a significant risk that a person with 
the abnormality will have or develop a serious physical or mental disability, a serious 
illness or any other serious medical condition’. Difficulties in the interpretation and 
application of condition-based criteria are discussed by Jackson in this volume.22  
  
Nevertheless, once a condition has been authorised by the HFEA as one that can 
be tested for, it would seem to follow that a decision can be legitimately taken to choose 
not to implant any tested embryo. Of course it is the case that a woman could not be 
forced to accept the implantation of any embryo due to the extreme violation of respect 
for her autonomy and bodily integrity that this would entail, and either gamete provider 
could withdraw consent to the use of embryos created with their gametes before 
treatment was provided.23 However, the point is that the couple could prefer to use 
unaffected embryos to those that are known to have a genetic condition disclosed by 
PGD. That choice is consistent with the approach taken by the new s. 13 provisions 
which seek to avoid such embryos being used for treatment. 
  
22 See Chapter 4. 
23 Schedule 3, para. 4 of the HFEA 1990, as amended. Although withdrawal of consent is 
now subject to a 12-month ‘cooling-off’ period, the effective right of veto of the 
use of embryos by a gamete provider is maintained. 
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It is also possible that if one condition is tested for, but the embryo is found to 
have other abnormalities, the couple could decide not to use it. Once the criteria for 
permitting PGD to take place have been satisfied, the detection of any other disorder 
meeting the criteria of sufficient seriousness would seem to permit it to be discarded in 
preference to other embryos. This would also be consistent with s. 13, which refers to 
‘embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality’, 
rather than being restricted to considering them only in respect of the condition that was 
originally being tested for. Section 13 prohibits their use in preference to embryos not 
known to have such an abnormality. The implications of this will be explored later, but it 
must follow that to discard such embryos in favour of others that are not known to be 
affected is a choice that lawfully can be made by a couple. 
 
PGD results in a possible choice within a batch of embryos all of which are tested – 
couple wishes to use an embryo that may be affected by a genetic disorder 
 
Of course, the obvious question might be why a couple would wish to use an affected 
embryo when they have others that could be used instead? Though it might be supposed 
that most potential parents would seek to avoid passing on genetic disorders, there are 
occasional examples of people seeking to make such reproductive choices. The scenario 
that has caused most discussion is where a couple deliberately seeks to have a child with 
a genetic condition for social reasons. The classic example is congenital deafness, 
illustrated by a deaf lesbian couple in the United States of America, although they did not 
actually use PGD. Ms Duchesneau and Ms McCullough sought to increase the chance of 
having a child who would be deaf by using a deaf friend as a sperm donor. Their decision 
has provoked considerable academic debate on the merits or otherwise of ‘choosing for 
disability’.24 The couple contended that deafness is a culture, not a disability and that 
24 Mundy, L., ‘A world of their own’, Washington Post 31 March 2002, W22; Sprigg, M., 
‘Lesbian couple create a child who is deaf like them’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
28 (2002): 283; Levy, N., ‘Deafness, culture and choice’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics 28 (2002): 284–5; Anstey, K.W. (2002) ‘Are attempts to have impaired 
children justifiable?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 28 (2002): 286–8; Savulescu, J., 
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rather than deafness reducing the child’s capacity, being able to hear would constitute a 
lack of capability in their child since a hearing child would be prevented from full 
participation in deaf culture.25 Using PGD to select an affected embryo could make the 
difference between increasing the chances of having a deaf child to making this a 
certainty. Another example can be found in the condition of achondroplasia. Its most 
obvious feature is that it is the commonest cause of disproportionately short stature, or 
dwarfism, although it may be associated with other medical complications.26 
Achondroplasia is an FGFR3 gene mutation which shows autosomal dominance in 
inheritance. Where both partners carry the mutation, in natural conception there is a 25 
per cent chance of an unaffected pregnancy, a 50 per cent chance of an affected 
pregnancy, and a 25 per cent chance of a pregnancy where the child carries two copies of 
the mutation, which is usually fatal shortly after birth. It has been suggested that a couple 
with achondroplasia might seek not only to avoid the possibility of conceiving a child 
with the lethal combination of genes but to have a child with achondroplasia, rather than 
one without.27 Again the reasons for this would be parental preference for a child like 
themselves, or practical issues in caring for the child.28 
 
 
‘Deaf lesbians, “designer disability” and the future of medicine’, British Medical 
Journal 325 (2002): 771–3. 
25 Darshak, M., Sanghavi, M.D., ‘Wanting babies like themselves, some parents choose 
genetic defects’, New York Times 5 December 2006. 
26 Horton, W.A., Hall, J.G., Hecht, J.T., ‘Achondroplasia’, Lancet 370(9582) (2007): 
162–9; Stratbucker, W.B., Serwint, J.R., ‘In brief: achondroplasia’, Pediatrics in 
Review 30 (2009): 114–15. 
27 Kolthoff, M., ‘Assisted reproduction and primum non nocere’, Virtual Mentor 9(9) 
(2007): 605–10. 
28 The HCSTC used the example of achondroplasia in its on-line consultation launched 
22 January 2004. In it, a fictional couple gave as the reason for wishing to use 
PGD to select for achondroplasia that a child of normal height would cause 
practical problems in their home. 
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Although the circumstances in which there might be a deliberate attempt to use 
PGD to conceive a child with a particular genetic disorder are likely to be rare in practice, 
there is evidence that they have been made. Baruch et al. surveyed American clinics 
offering PGD and found that 3 per cent of respondents reported having intentionally used 
PGD ‘to select an embryo for the presence of a disability’.29 It is exactly this kind of 
choice that s. 13 of the amended HFEA 1990 is directed against. Indeed this is made 
crystal clear in the explanatory note that accompanied a draft of the Human Tissues and 
Embryos Bill published in 2007. Following a description of the intention to make it a 
condition of treatment licences that embryos tested and known to have specified 
abnormalities were not to be preferred in treatment services to those which did not, and 
that this prohibition would also extend to the selection of persons as gamete or embryo 
donors, it went on to say: 
 
There have been reported cases outside the UK involving the positive selection of 
deaf donors in order deliberately to result in a deaf child. The new section [as 
numbered] would prevent this.30 
 
It follows that, in this scenario, a deliberate choice to select an affected embryo in 
preference to others that were unaffected would be prevented. This may pose particular 
problems for couples with conditions such as achondroplasia, where one possibility is 
that an embryo will have a combination of genes incompatible with survival. Although 
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling can be performed during pregnancy to detect 
double dominant mutations, the use of PGD would enable decisions to be made without 
having to consider abortion where this variation is found to exist. However, there may be 
29 Baruch, S., Kaufman, D.J., Hudson, K.L, ‘Genetic testing of embryos: practices and 
perspectives of US IVF clinics’, Fertility and Sterility 89 (2008): 1053–8; Baruch, 
S., Kaufman, D.J., Hudson, K.L., ‘Preimplantation genetic screening: a survey of 
in vitro fertilization clinics’, Genetics in Medicine 10 (2008): 685–90. 
30 Department of Health, Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, May 2007, Cm 7087, 
para. 66. 
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couples with achondroplasia who, while they might not prefer to have a child who also 
has a single copy of the mutation and who is affected by the condition, would be content 
with this. The same of course may be true for other genetic conditions, but unless they 
have variants which are likely to be fatal or cause additional problems for the child, 
couples who have no preference would be unlikely to opt for PGD.31 If a woman had 
undergone screening during pregnancy, there would be no question of forcing her to 
undergo a termination of pregnancy, whether the foetus had a single or even double copy 
of the mutated gene. However, if PGD were undertaken to avoid the fatal mutation, then 
could a decision be made to use an embryo with the single mutation? According to the 
new provisions, it would appear not, at least if they had other embryos that were free 
from the mutation.32 While wishing to avoid a fatal condition, and the consequent 
decision that might arise as to whether to abort a pregnancy, it appears that women using 
PGD who might have chosen to carry an embryo with achondroplasia could be denied 
that opportunity under the new provisions. 
 
However, it may be argued that the legislation was not intended to achieve this 
outcome and that there are means of interpretation that would avoid it. One possible 
solution might be to focus on the wording of the legislative provisions, which are 
couched in terms of ‘preference’. It could be suggested that if a couple were willing to 
have either a child with achondroplasia or one without, that they are not in fact 
expressing a preference for a child with a genetic disorder. If this were accepted, then 
they could be permitted to use an embryo chosen at random from the embryos that do not 
have the fatal genetic combination, but which may include embryos with and without the 
31 See for example a survey of children of deaf adults where more than 70 per cent stated 
no preference for a hearing or deaf child, and believed that genetic selection for 
and against deafness was not appropriate. Mand, C., et al. ‘Genetic selection for 
deafness: the views of hearing children of deaf adults’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
35 (2009): 722–8.  
32 The issue of the comparator group to which an affected embryo is being preferred will 
be considered in more detail later. 
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non-fatal mutation. This would appear to satisfy the intention of the provisions to prohibit 
deliberately using affected embryos for treatment but allow some room for manoeuvre for 
potential parental choice to run the risk of a child having what is likely to be regarded as 
a disabling medical condition. The potential parents in such a situation are not 
‘preferring’ an embryo with such a condition, nor seeking to select one on this basis; 
merely they are accepting the possibility. 
 
There are some grounds to suggest that the provisions might bear such an 
interpretation since, despite the clear intention behind them, it does not necessarily follow 
that even where there is a known risk that an embryo may have a genetic abnormality or 
be of a sex giving rise to the risk of a resulting child having a serious physical or mental 
disability, serious illness or serious medical condition, it cannot be implanted. This is 
apparent from the guidance given in the HFEA’s 8th Code of Practice in relation to 
embryo testing.33 There is no absolute prohibition on implanting such embryos. In 
addition, although the Code of Practice omits to refer to the preferential selection of 
embryos here, the wording of the statute does appear to make ‘preference’ a necessary 
criterion for the restrictions on embryo selection to apply. Furthermore, there is no 
requirement that couples submit their embryos to PGD. Rather, the expectation is the 
opposite: that PGD is currently seen as requiring justification in defined circumstances 
and is not to be used as routine practice. There is no statutory requirement that a couple 
with a known inheritable disorder, or where there is a clear risk of a genetic abnormality 
in an embryo, have to agree to PGD on embryos created with their gametes before they 
can use them in treatment. Similarly, donors who are known to have such disorders or be 
at risk for them are not prevented from providing gametes under s. 13(9); it is only 
preferentially selecting them that is prevented. In fact, it is possible that limitations on 
providing treatment to couples or using donor gametes might be placed where there is a 
known risk of embryos having genetic disorders, but these would need to rest on a 
different provision – that of the general welfare of a resulting child, contained in s. 13(5). 
This will be explored further in due course. For the moment, I will turn to an even more 
33 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice, London: Stationary Office, 2009, 10C. 
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contentious possibility – that the prohibitions on embryo selection may not prevent a 
deliberate attempt to select for an embryo with a genetic disorder.  
 
PGD undertaken on one embryo at a time – couple wishes to use an affected embryo 
 
Here the couple chooses not to undertake PGD on a batch of embryos, but rather only one 
embryo at a time is created and tested. For the sake of argument, the first embryo tested 
has a genetic disorder that is contained in the HFEA’s authorised list of conditions for 
testing, but the couple wishes to use it for treatment. 
 
My contention would be that the conditions set out in ss. 13(9)–(11) may not 
prevent them from making this choice. This is because of the wording of these provisions 
which is expressed in terms of ‘preference’ in selection, comparing the affected embryo 
with others that are ‘not known’ to have the abnormality or carry the risk.  
 
This is reinforced by the guidance given in the HFEA’s 8th Code of Practice on the 
interpretation of the restrictions on selecting embryos for treatment in s. 13 of the HFEA 
1990, as amended:  
 
The law prohibits the selection of an embryo for treatment if it is known to: 
(a) have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrial abnormality involving a 
significant risk that the person with the abnormality will develop a serious 
physical or mental disability, a serious illness, or a serious medical 
condition, or 
(b) be of a sex that carries a particular risk that any resulting child will have or 
develop a gender-related serious physical or mental disability, serious 
illness, or serious medical condition 
 
This applies only where there is at least one other embryo suitable for transfer 
that is not known to have the characteristics. Where there is no other embryo 
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suitable for transfer, an embryo with these characteristics may be transferred. [at 
10C, Emphasis added] 
 
The issue then becomes what the comparator group for the affected embryo is. 
There are a number of possible options here. These could include all in vitro embryos; 
embryos donated for other people’s treatment or embryos created using the couple’s 
gametes. Another factor would relate to whether these other embryos would need to 
currently exist or whether the possibility that they could be created would be relevant. 
Presumably some territorial restriction would operate so that only in vitro embryos 
coming under the remit of the HFE Acts would be contemplated. Which comparator 
group the affected embryo is being ‘preferred’ to will determine whether or not these 
restrictions bite. 
 
It should be said at the outset that there is a difference between embryos ‘known 
not’ to be affected, and those ‘not known’ to be affected. The former suggests that there 
has been a positive test to determine the genetic make-up of the embryo, the latter does 
not. So for example, if the requirement against preference was that embryos known to be 
affected could not be preferred to those known not to be affected, the scope for selecting 
affected embryos might be increased by simply not testing all of the embryos at the same 
time. There would then be no other embryos which were known not to have the condition 
and hence the prohibition on selection would not come into effect. While there might still 
be room for doubt here, since the comparator group of embryos would remain to be 
determined, requiring the comparator group to have been tested and found not to have the 
condition would make it more likely that the couple could avoid the restriction since there 
is no general requirement to conduct PGD. 
 
However, this is not what the provisions say. They require a preference to be 
expressed in comparison with embryos that are not known to be affected. This still would 
seem to permit a wide or a narrow scope for such a comparison to be made. There are 
strong arguments against the idea of a very widely drawn category of comparator 
embryos. It may be contended that there should be a realistic possibility of the couple 
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being able to access and use an alternative embryo. For example, the fact that other 
people have embryos stored for their own treatment that are not known to be affected by 
genetic disorder would not allow the couple with the affected embryo to seek to use them. 
It would therefore be absurd to suggest that in seeking to use their own embryo, they are 
‘preferring’ to do so than to use these other embryos. This is not a choice that is open to 
them. This supports immediately narrowing the category of comparator embryos to those 
that could be available to the couple to use, which leaves only embryos that are donated 
for other people’s treatment and other embryos of the couple.  
 
The next issue is whether the other embryos must actually be in existence at the 
time that the comparison is being made or whether the possibility of future unaffected 
embryos that they could use can be brought into consideration. The response to this is 
less obvious, since there is no guidance as to the timeframe in which the comparison need 
be made. Again however, it can plausibly be argued that the preference which the couple 
expresses should be directed to options that are currently available to them, not 
predicated on some, as yet uncertain, prospect of being able to secure donated embryos or 
successful creation of embryos from their own gametes that are not known to have 
disorders. This would suggest that the comparator group that the s. 13 provisions are 
concerned with are other embryos that the couple has available to use at the time when 
decisions about the affected embryo are being made. This seems to be implied from the 
HFEA guidance which refers to ‘no other embryos being suitable for transfer’, which 
suggests that the comparator embryos must be available for transfer at the time the 
decision is being made.34 
 
If this is accepted, and it is fair to say that this remains a speculative approach, then it 
would seem to follow that if the couple do not have any other embryos in existence, they 
would not fall foul of the ss. 13(9–11) treatment provisions by seeking to use the affected 
embryo. As noted earlier, these do not provide a blanket prohibition on the use of 
embryos that have been tested and found to have particular genetic conditions; only upon 
34 Ibid., at 10C. 
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preferring to use them to those that are not known to have such conditions if there ‘is at 
least one other embryo suitable for transfer that is not known to have the 
characteristics’.35 For a couple determined to seek to have a child with a particular 
genetic make-up, the route might accordingly be to ask to have embryos created and 
tested serially and consenting to the disposal of embryos found not to have the condition 
until one is found to have it. Consent could be withdrawn for an unaffected embryo’s 
continued storage; it could be donated for treatment of others, training purposes or for 
research. Any of these options would render it unavailable for a couple’s own 
treatment.36 Embarking on this route would rest on the feasibility of having gametes 
available to use to create embryos in this way. It is likely to involve egg freezing which, 
as the HFEA notes, ‘is still a relatively new and experimental technique’ and has a low 
success rate in maintaining viable gametes.37 Although additional methods such as 
vitrification are becoming available which appear to improve the chances of eggs 
surviving the freezing and thawing processes:  
 
Records show that up to 31/12/2008, around 6388 eggs have been stored in the 
UK for the patient’s own use. To date around 88 embryos from stored eggs have 
been created. These embryos were transferred to women in around 32 cycles, 
which resulted in around 3 live births. These figures are for both eggs which have 
been stored using slow freezing and vitrification methods.38  
 
This would also require the willingness of clinics to participate in what would clearly be 
an attempt to circumvent the statutory provisions. Nevertheless, such circumvention 
would not appear to be unlawful nor to directly contravene current HFEA policy. The 
35 Ibid. 
36 HFEA 1990 s. 12(1), s. 14(12), s. 15(4) and Schedule 3, as amended.  
37 HFEA website, ‘Freezing and storing eggs’, www.hfea.gov.uk/46.html (accessed on 
11/11/ 2011.) 
38 Ibid. 
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HFEA’s 8th Code of Practice, having allowed for the possibility that embryos known to 
have genetic abnormalities can be implanted, goes on to say: 
 
10.17  
The use of an embryo known to have an abnormality as described above [in 10C] 
should be subject to consideration of the welfare of any resulting child and should 
normally have approval from a clinical ethics committee. 
   
10.18 
If a centre decides that it is appropriate to provide treatment services to a woman 
using an embryo known to have an abnormality as described above, it should 
document the reason for the use of that embryo. 
 
NOTE: An example of an embryo not suitable for transfer in this context is one 
that has no realistic prospect of resulting in a live birth.  
 
Therefore, even if the specific statutory restrictions on selecting affected embryos 
can be avoided, it is entirely possible that such a practice would still be caught by the 
more general restrictions of the HFEA 1990, if the implantation of an affected embryo 
was thought to sufficiently risk any resulting child’s welfare. There is, therefore, a two-
stage process in considering whether embryos can be implanted where PGD is involved: 
first the embryo-testing provisions in ss. 13(9-11), and secondly the welfare provisions in 
s. 13(5). 
 
It has been asserted that the underlying justification for limiting the use of 
embryos found to have genetic abnormalities is based on the welfare of the child 
principle. The basis for this assertion will be considered in more detail, before turning to 
two fundamental issues that deserve closer examination: to what extent is the concept of 
the welfare of the child really appropriate in this context, whether it is the reason behind 
those sections related solely to PGD or in the overarching conditions for treatment in s. 
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13(5); and how should it be balanced against respect for the wishes of the potential 
parents to select an embryo known to have genetic abnormalities? 
 
The welfare of the child principle as a basis for embryo-testing provisions 
 
The welfare of the child and the ss. 13(9–11) embryo-testing provisions 
 
The development of the techniques of PGD was based on apparently beneficent grounds: 
to improve the success rates for assisted reproduction by not commencing a pregnancy 
with an embryo that has a serious disorder that might result in miscarriage; to avoid a 
choice having to be made whether to abort a foetus with a serious disorder identified 
during pregnancy and, underlying this, concerns about the welfare of children.39 The 
development of the role of the HFEA in regulating PGD has been discussed elsewhere in 
this volume and so will not be repeated here. However, questions about the use of PGD to 
select for disability have been asked in a number of public consultations and reviews. For 
example, in 1999 a public consultation exercise was carried out by a joint working party 
of the HFEA and the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing.40 After outlining the 
potential choices that could be made to test embryos and act on the results, including 
seeking to use an affected embryo, it asked respondents ‘Can the principle of the Welfare 
of the Child ever be compatible with the decision to begin a pregnancy knowing that a 
child will be born with a genetic disorder?’ The responses were as follows: 
 
39 See for example, the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Warnock Report), London: Stationary Office, 1984, para. 12.13. 
40 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority and Advisory Committee on Genetic 
Testing, Consultation Document on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, London: 
Stationery Office, 1999. 
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47% acknowledged that there might be situations in which the replacement of an 
affected embryo would be compatible with the principle of the welfare of the 
child. 31% argued that this should be a decision left to the parents. 22% argued 
that starting such a pregnancy could never be compatible with this principle.41 
 
Although the number of responses was small (98), and hence the weight that can 
be placed on them is limited, they revealed a range of factors that were thought to be 
relevant: 
  
The majority of these responses qualified their answers by stating that this might 
only be appropriate in certain circumstances, depending on severity of the 
condition, family situation and other similar considerations. In addition, most of 
the ‘yes’ responses concerned only the question of affected embryos where there 
were no unaffected ones for transfer, but rejected PGD as a method of choosing 
an affected embryo for social or other reasons. 
 
It should also be noted that many respondents were unfamiliar with the 
terminology of ‘welfare of the child’ and some respondents questioned its 
meaning, range or relevance.42 
 
It is interesting to see some doubts being expressed about the meaning of the 
welfare of the child principle and how it might apply in this situation. 
 
On the specific issue of selecting for disability, the HCSTC in its report entitled 
Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law was ambivalent and did not reach a final 
conclusion on whether embryos with, as it termed them, ‘undesirable characteristics’ 
should be able to be used in treatment. On this issue it said: 
41 Human Genetics Commission and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
Outcome of the Public Consultation on Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 
London: Stationary Office, November 2001, paras. 30–3. 
42 Ibid. 
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We can imagine that many clinicians would baulk at the idea of selecting, for 
example, a deaf child using PGD, but we do not feel that the creation of a child 
with reduced life opportunities is sufficient grounds for regulatory intervention, 
else we might logically deny poor people IVF. Professor Tom Shakespeare told us 
that PGD should not be allowed to select out ‘minor or trivial’ conditions such as 
restricted growth or deafness. [Ev 363] On this basis, it is difficult to argue that 
they should not be selected rather than deselected. A more challenging but 
unlikely scenario would be the desire to select a child who would suffer obvious 
discomfort (rather than disadvantage), or worse. In this area there needs to be 
further debate.43  
 
It was therefore not at the behest of the HCSTC that the ss. 13 (9–11) provisions 
on embryo selection were included in the legislation, nor was any suggestion of this 
raised in the government response to this report.44 However, a further consultation 
exercise undertaken by the Department of Health appears to have provided the basis for 
their inclusion in subsequent legislative proposals. This consultation specifically asked 
whether there should be a prohibition on deliberately screening in, or selecting for, 
impairments or disabilities as opposed to screening out, or selecting embryos free from 
impairments or disabilities.45 Responses to the consultation were published in March 
2006. There was no attempt in this document to draw conclusions, and it was noted that 
on the issue of screening in or selecting for impairments the responses demonstrated a 
43 Para. 145 
44 Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law: Government Response to the Report 
of the HCSTC, London: Stationary Office, Cm 6641, August 2005. 
45 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A 
Public Consultation, London: London: Stationary Office, August 2005, para. 
5.20. 
156 
                                                
range of perspectives.46 Nevertheless, it appears likely that the impetus for including 
legislative provisions on this subject came from the HFEA’s response, which sought 
parliamentary guidance. Following this consultation, proposals for legislation appeared in 
a White Paper issued in December 2006. Despite the lack of any clear consensus or 
recommendation for this approach in the prior consultative processes, it was stated that 
‘Deliberately screening-in a disease or disorder will be prohibited’.47 While the sections 
in which this issue was addressed changed at different stages of the drafting of the Bill 
and its passage through Parliament, the fundamental principle of prohibiting a preference 
for affected embryos to those not known to be affected remained consistent.48 
 
As well as seeking to improve success rates in terms of live births in assisted 
reproduction, and to try to avoid the issue of abortion arising, as it might if abnormalities 
were discovered only during pregnancy, the inclusion of these provisions seems, 
therefore, to be rooted in some notion of the concept of child welfare. 
  
The welfare of the child principle and child law 
 
46 Department of Health, Report on the Review of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act: A Public Consultation, London: London: Stationary Office, 
March 2006, para. 5.3. 
47 Department of Health, Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990: 
Proposals for revised legislation (including establishment of the Regulatory 
Authority for Tissues and Embryos), London: Stationary Office, December 2006, 
Cm 6989. 
48 See for example Draft Human Tissue and Embryology Bill published for pre-
legislative scrutiny. May 2007, s. 21(4). 
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The need to take account of the welfare of children born as a result of treatment services 
governed by the HFE Acts may seem at first to be an uncontroversial proposition.49 
Concern to protect children is at the heart of international declarations such as the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is the most widely ratified 
international convention in existence.50 This Convention states in Article 3 that: 
 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. (Emphasis added). 
 
In the UK this approach may be seen to be reflected in the general legal principles 
that govern decisions about children. In England and Wales these are set out in the 
Children Act 1989, which provides that when hearing cases under the Act, the courts are 
required to have the welfare of the child as their paramount consideration. There are 
similar provisions under the equivalent statute in Scotland, the Children (Scotland) Act 
1995. In England and Wales there is also the inherent jurisdiction which is usually 
exercised in wardship proceedings, although it may be used independently. Here, the 
principle is that judicial decisions must be made in the child’s best interests.51 It can be 
argued that there are differences between the expressions set out in statute and at 
common law; however, largely for practical reasons, the courts have sought to minimise 
them so that the terms welfare and best interests are used interchangeably.  
49 I have explored the issues arising from the use of the welfare/best interests test in more 
detail in Elliston, S., The Best Interests of the Child in Healthcare, Abingdon: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007, esp ch 1. Some parts of this discussion are taken 
from it. 
50 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Res. 44/25 of 20 
November 1989. It came into force in the UK on 16 December 1991. 
51 For the use of wardship, see for example Re J (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 3 
WLR 507 CA; R v. Portsmouth NHS Trust, ex part Glass [1999] 2 FLR 905 CA. 
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However, equating the two terms is not unproblematic. It can be suggested that a 
welfare approach is less protective of children than a best interests approach, since, as has 
on occasion been recognised by the courts, if we are speaking of what is in a child’s best 
interests, then logically there can be only one answer.52 This presents a number of 
difficulties – first in the actual prediction of what the outcome will be of a particular 
choice. Breen has suggested that this requires the decision-maker to have shaman-like 
qualities for the prediction of future events.53 It also implicitly involves a value 
judgement: what factors are relevant to a person’s interests and how are these factors to 
be weighed? Although it has been held that best interests encompass medical, emotional 
and all other welfare issues,54 there may well remain ample scope for disagreement over 
what outcomes, to the extent they can be predicted, are best for a child. Evidence to 
support this can be found in the numerous treatment decisions brought before the courts 
in England and Wales, notably in the context of withholding or withdrawing treatment 
from severely ill children who have profoundly disabling conditions.55 
 
A welfare test by contrast can be suggested to be more flexible and less dogmatic, 
since it does not claim that there is one answer that is best, merely that a decision 
promotes or safeguards, or is at least not harmful to, the interests of the child. Of course, 
52 Re SL (adult patient) (medical treatment) [2000] 2 FCR 452 CA, per Dame Elizabeth 
Butler-Sloss P., at p. 464.  
53 Breen, C., The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: A Western Tradition in 
International and Comparative Law, International Studies in Human Rights 
Vol.72, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2002. 
54 Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FCR 193 CA, per Dame Butler-
Sloss P., at p. 200. 
55 See for example Re C (a minor) (withdrawal of lifesaving treatment) (1997) 40 BMLR 
31; Re T (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, [1997] 1 
All ER 906, 35 BMLR 63 CA; Wyatt v. Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust [2005] 
EWCA Civ 1181 CA. 
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the problems of ascertaining and predicting the outcome of alternatives on child welfare 
will remain. A range of different outcomes for the child may be viewed as being in the 
child’s interests, depending on the values and priorities given to particular aspects of 
child welfare and development. In fact, in the main, such decisions are devolved to 
parents to make, with relatively limited scope for intervention, unless it seems likely to 
result in what is regarded as serious harm. Indeed this can be considered to be part of a 
social contract: 
 
It is a hallmark of a democratic society that while parents have the primary 
responsibility to look after their children, they are free to bring them up in the 
manner in which they deem best for the children’s welfare.56 
 
Parents have the legal responsibility to safeguard and promote the child’s health, 
development and welfare.57 Nevertheless, the circumstances in which their decisions are 
open to challenge are relatively limited and it can be suggested that they generally hinge 
on a threshold of a significant risk of serious, avoidable harm being reached. 
 
A further problem lies in deciding what weight the welfare of a child should be 
given. As we have seen, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states 
that ‘the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’ when decisions are 
taken by outside agencies, including courts.58 This followed considerable debate over the 
wording to be used.59 However, it is not the expression used in the Children Acts, which 
is that the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration. At first glance, then, the 
Children Acts appear to apply a less protective standard of decision-making than the UN 
56 Thomson, J., Family Law in Scotland, 5th edn, Glasgow: Tottel, 2006, at p. 257. 
57 This is explicit in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 1(1)(a) and implicit in the 
Children Act 1989, s. 3. 
58 Article 3(1).  
59 Breen, C., The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: A Western Tradition in 
International and Comparative Law, International Studies in Human Rights 
Vol.72, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, at pp. 78–84. 
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Convention, since they refer to child welfare rather than a child’s best interests, but this 
factor is then given overriding importance, being the paramount consideration rather than 
a primary consideration. The test under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts in England 
and Wales is that the child’s best interests are the prime and paramount concern.60 
However, as noted, the courts have sought to avoid imposing different standards when 
making decisions about children, whatever the procedure taken to bring a case before 
them. Effectively, therefore, the standard adopted is that the best interests of the child are 
the paramount concern of the court. 
 
However, no legally enforceable rights attach to embryos as they are not regarded 
as legal persons, so decisions affecting them cannot be made on the basis of child 
welfare61 and it would effectively alter the provision of assisted reproductive treatment 
beyond recognition were this to be contemplated. Family law statutes such as the 
Children Act 1989 and the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 only apply to children after 
birth. Furthermore, the UK, upon its ratification of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, declared that it interpreted the Convention as applicable only 
following a live birth.62 Nevertheless, consideration of these instruments highlights the 
potential for disagreement over the standard of child protection that ought to apply in 
decisions concerning children, the weight that it should be given and the difficulties in 
60 See for example Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 3 All ER 145, 
CA. 
61 Paton v. BPAS [1979] 1 QB 276, considered by the EctHR in Paton v. United 
Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 408 (ECHR); Kelly v. Kelly 1997 SLT 896 CS (IH). 
The likely impact of a decision upon the welfare of a foetus or resulting child can 
only be considered indirectly in so far as it may affect the best interests of a 
pregnant woman who lacks capacity to make treatment decisions for herself: St 
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v. S (No. 2) [1998] 3 All ER 673 CA; Re F (in 
utero) [1988] FCR 529; [1988] Fam 122 (CA). 
62 The UK Reservation and Declarations, CRC/C/2/Rev 4, at para. 32, 16 December 
1991. 
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interpreting deceptively simple statements, even in the context of children who have 
legally recognised and protected interests. This also raises the issue of the legitimate role 
of the state in displacing the views of parents about what is in their children’s interests 
and when their decisions can be regarded as so detrimental to child welfare that steps 
may be taken to protect children from them. 
 
It should be said that some have questioned the continuing adherence to the central place 
of a principle of child welfare or best interests of the child in the era of human rights, and 
it has been contended that: 
 
It will no longer do, it seems, to frame issues of child welfare in terms of making 
traditional ‘best interests’ judgments: at the very least, concern for a child’s 
welfare should be conceptualised as a matter of the child’s rights-protected 
interests.63 
 
While there is merit in this, welfare is the terminology used in domestic 
legislation and the content of such evaluations may be unlikely to differ in practice. For 
this reason, discussion in this chapter has concentrated on this concept. 
 
The development and retention of the s. 13(5) welfare of the child principle within 
the HFE Acts 
 
The difficulties in applying a welfare standard multiply when what is at stake is not 
parental decision-making concerning children they already have, but rather where the 
decision under consideration is whether to allow them to seek to have children using 
63 Brownsword, R., ‘Happy families, consenting couples, and children with dignity: sex 
selection and saviour siblings’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 17(4) (2005): 
435–73, at 435. 
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assisted reproductive technologies. The restrictions on selection of embryos for treatment 
following PGD do not make any direct reference to the welfare concept, though as has 
been demonstrated, this is undoubtedly the justification for them; this is explicit in 
s13(5). The standard of child protection that is set out in this section is couched in the 
language of welfare rather than best interests. However, in respect of the weight to be 
given to it in deciding whether or not treatment services should be provided, this section 
does not prioritise the welfare of the child. It must be ‘taken into account’ but it is not the 
paramount, or even a primary, consideration on the face of the statute. This 
notwithstanding, it appears to be a provision that may assume considerable importance in 
determining whether specific embryos can be used in treatment services. 
 
In the development of a legislative approach to reproductive technologies, 
concern to safeguard the interests of children who might be born as a result of assisted 
reproduction can be traced back at least to the Warnock Committee Report, and 
references are made to this issue in various contexts throughout it.64 It is interesting to 
see, however, that, even then, there was disagreement about the extent to which such 
concerns should be a governing factor: 
 
Our emphasis on the arguments may make it appear that there was a uniformity of 
approach and moral feeling in the Inquiry. The reality however has been that our 
personal feelings and reactions have been as diverse as those presented in the 
evidence. Some members have a clear perception of the family and its role within 
society; in considering the various techniques before us their focus has been on 
the primacy of the interests of the child, and on upholding family values. Other 
members have felt equally strongly about the rights of the individual within 
society.65  
 
64 Warnock Report. 
65 Ibid., para. 3. 
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In fact, when the White Paper introducing what came to be the HFEA 1990 was 
issued, it contained no specific reference to a child welfare principle, nor did the Bill 
itself. It came into consideration almost by chance in the course of debates about whether 
access to treatment should be confined to married couples and it was in this context that 
concerns about child welfare led to amendments to the Bill. Nevertheless, once the 
principle had been put forward, it commanded unstinting support. As Jackson, writing in 
2002, notes: 
 
In the Parliamentary debates leading up to the passage of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act in 1990, the inclusion of a welfare principle was neither 
challenged nor defended. Instead, it was simply assumed to be self-evidently true 
that their future children’s welfare ought to be taken into account before a couple 
is offered assistance with conception, and this assumption undoubtedly persists 
today.66 
 
Indeed, it came to be considered that one of the ‘most important principles’ 
underlying the HFEA 1990 was the welfare of any children born.67 However, a more 
critical appraisal of the welfare principle appeared in the Report of the HCSTC, where 
Recommendation 24 stated that: 
 
The welfare of the child provision discriminates against the infertile and some sections of 
society, is impossible to implement and is of questionable practical value in protecting 
the interests of children born as a result of assisted reproduction… The welfare of the 
child provision has enabled the HFEA and clinics to make judgements that are more 
properly made by patients in consultation with their doctor. It should be abolished in its 
current form. The minimum threshold principle should apply but should specify that this 
66 Jackson, E., ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’, Modern Law 
Review 65 (2002): 176–203, at 177. 
67 Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd; Hadley v. Midland Fertility Services Ltd [2004] 1 
FLR 67 CA para. 37, per Wall, J. 
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threshold should be the risk of unpreventable and significant harm. Doctors should 
minimise the risks to any child conceived from treatment within the constraints of 
available knowledge but this should be encouraged through the promotion of good 
medical practice not legislation.68 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the HCSTC expressed most concern in respect of 
judgements being made about the prospective parenting environment. No issue was taken 
with the general idea of protecting children from harm, although the suggested threshold 
for any legislative provision was a relatively high one. While recommending that good 
medical practice should be sufficient to minimise risks of harm, this does, of course, raise 
the question of the proper extent of clinical discretion and whether it might be amenable 
to challenge, for example, through human rights principles.69 Nevertheless, it might be 
expected that justification for the exercise of discretion in a particular case would be 
required.  
 
However, in response to the HCSTC recommendations, the government only 
recognised ‘that attempting to frame these matters in national legislation and guidance 
which pays due regard both to individual circumstances and to the need for objectivity 
and fairness is extremely difficult’ and undertook to ‘seek wider public views on how the 
welfare of children born as a result of assisted reproduction may best be secured’.70 This 
it did in 2005 in the Department of Health public consultation previously referred to.71 
The questions asked included whether the welfare of the child principle should be 
retained and if so, whether this should be a matter of ‘good medical practice’ as 
68 Para. 107. 
69 Human Rights Act 1998. See for example, Bell, L., ‘Is the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008 compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)?’, Web JCLI 1 [2009], available at 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2009/issue1/bell1.html (accessed on 09/02/2012). 
70 Human Reproductive Technologies and the Law, paras. 39 and 40. 
71 Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, s. 3. 
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recommended by the HCSTC, or overseen by the HFEA. It also asked whether welfare 
should be restricted to consideration of the child’s medical circumstances and whether it 
should be specified that risk assessment should relate to ‘serious’ or ‘significant’ harm. 
As with the questions asked about embryo testing, responses were mixed and no 
conclusions were drawn in the report on the consultation.72 In the end, the government 
rejected abolition of the welfare of the child provision, or even a major revision, opting 
instead to address only the assessment of future parental support for a resulting child. 
This principle therefore operates on two levels: as both a general condition for offering 
any assisted reproduction governed by the HFE Acts and now, in addition, as an implicit 
justification for the specific provisions concerning treatment involving PGD. As it stands, 
the provisions in the HFE Acts provide no guidance on how the welfare principle should 
be interpreted. This is provided instead by the HFEA in its Code of Practice.  
 
The welfare principle and the HFEA Code of Practice 
Concerns about the application of the welfare principle to treatment decisions resulted in 
the HFEA conducting its own review of this issue at the same time as the HCSTC was 
conducting its more wide-ranging review of the HFEA 1990 and the role of the HFEA.73 
 
As a result, the HFEA introduced a number of changes that it claimed would lead to a 
‘better system for protecting the welfare of children born as a result of fertility 
treatment’.74 It went on to summarise some of the key changes as follows: 
72 Department of Health, Report on the Review of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, ch. 3. 
73 HFEA, Tomorrow’s Children: A consultation on guidance to licensed fertility clinics 
on taking in account the welfare of children to be born of assisted conception 
treatment, London: Stationary Office, January 2005. 
74 HFEA press release ‘Improved welfare checks system will be better, fairer and clearer 
for fertility patients, GPs and clinics’, 2 November 2005. 
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A clear focus on areas of serious harm, with vague and subjective social questions 
removed from the assessment  
That clinics should assume they will provide treatment unless there is evidence 
that the child is likely to be at risk of serious harm. This will enable treatment for 
the majority of patients to go ahead with the minimum of disruption.  
Clinicians should use their professional judgement to decide which cases warrant further 
investigation rather than being obliged to contact a patient’s GP in each and every case.75  
What is interesting to observe is the concentration on a risk-based assessment and, in 
particular, the emphasis on medical conditions that might affect a child resulting from 
treatment regulated by the HFEA. 
 
The current guidance at the time of writing is the 8th Code of Practice which was 
produced to take account of the HFEA 2008. It includes the following provisions: 
 
The centre should assess each patient and their partner (if they have one) before 
providing any treatment, and should use this assessment to decide whether there is 
a risk of significant harm or neglect to any child.76 
 
While some of the factors concern the criteria of ‘supportive parenting’, there is a 
specific consideration of the likely health of the child at 8.10:  
 
(b)(iii) medical history, where the medical history indicates that any child who 
may be born is likely to suffer from a serious medical condition… 
 
and more generally, 
75 Ibid. 
76 At 8.3. 
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 (iv) circumstances that the centre considers likely to cause serious harm to any 
child mentioned above. 
 
The Code of Practice states that the centre should refuse treatment if it: 
 
(a) concludes that any child who may be born or any existing child of the 
family is likely to be at risk of significant harm or neglect,  
or 
(b) cannot obtain enough information to conclude that there is no 
significant risk.77  
 
Despite offering such guidance, the statutory responsibility for making the 
assessment required by s. 13(5) remains that of the treatment centre, which must decide 
how to apply the welfare principle in an individual case. For procedures involving PGD, 
this would be the provision that would finally determine whether treatment could be 
provided if the hurdle of avoiding restrictions on using embryos at risk of or known to 
have genetic abnormalities can be overcome in any of the ways outlined earlier. 
However, where the question arises of using an embryo which has been tested and found 
to have abnormalities arises, the approval of a clinical ethics committee is also expected 
by the HFEA, adding another layer of scrutiny in this situation.78  
 
Applying the welfare principle to assisted reproduction 
 
Notwithstanding the retention of the welfare principle, the importing of a familiar 
concept in child law to assisted reproduction has, as has already been indicated, provoked 
77 Ibid., para 8.15. 
78 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice, at 10.17. 
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a range of criticism.79 Much of it stemmed from the application of this concept to the 
potential parenting environment that a child might be born into, especially related to the 
original version of s. 13(5) which required the ‘need of the child for a father’ to be taken 
into account. With the replacement of this wording with the ‘need for supportive 
parenting’ by the 2008 Act some of these concerns may have been addressed, although 
they do not disappear. However, there are more fundamental objections to the use of the 
principle at all when deciding whether reproductive treatment services should be offered.  
 
The usual way of looking at a welfare of the child assessment is to attempt to 
weigh the relative burdens and benefits that would accrue to a child depending on the 
decision that is taken. A ‘balance sheet’ approach has been advocated in cases involving 
medical treatment, for example, where the provision of treatment to severely ill or 
disabled young children is under consideration.80 While this is a far from straightforward 
approach even in these circumstances, it might seem an initially attractive way of 
evaluating the consequences of any impairment that a child might have if it were born. 
There is, however, a difficulty with this when making decisions about embryos and that is 
that the alternatives for this embryo are either for it to become a child with the 
abnormality and all that this would entail, or not to be born at all. This is what has 
become known as the non-identity problem and has generated particular interest in the 
field of bioethics as a result of the work of Parfit.81 If the decision had been taken to use 
79 See for example Douglas, G., ‘Assisted reproduction and the welfare of the child’, 
Current Legal Problems 46 (1993): 53–74; Jackson, ‘Conception and the 
irrelevance of the welfare principle’; Harris, J., ‘Rights and reproductive choice’, 
in Harris, J., Holm, S. (eds.), The Future of Human Reproduction: Ethics, Choice, 
and Regulation, Oxford: Clarendon, 1998, pp. 5–37. 
80 See for example Wyatt v. Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust [2005] EWCA Civ 1181 
CA, at paras. 87 and 90. 
81 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, ch 16. For 
authors drawing on this work, see for example Gavaghan, C., ‘Designer donors’? 
Tissue-typing and the regulation of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis’, Web 
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another embryo than an affected one, a different child – with a different identity – would 
be born. Viewed in such terms, it might appear that considering the welfare of the child 
would require an assessment of the benefits of existence (with the anticipated level of 
resulting disability) against non-existence. 
 
Comparisons of existence with non-existence have been considered to be 
inherently problematic as may be seen by looking at wrongful life claims. In such claims, 
as with the case of embryo selection, it is not alleged that wrongful conduct caused the 
disability; rather, that it caused a child with disability to be born due to opportunities to 
prevent this not having been offered to the parent(s). In such cases, it is the child that is 
the claimant, not the parents.82 This kind of claim was considered in the case of McKay v. 
Essex Area Health Authority (1982) which concerned a child whose mother had 
contracted rubella during pregnancy and had not been advised about the possible 
consequences for the foetus nor given the opportunity to consider an abortion. For 
Ackner, LJ no comparison was possible between existence and non-existence. As he put 
it, ‘how can a court begin to evaluate non-existence. “the undiscovered country from 
whose bourn no traveller returns”?’.83 By contrast, for Stephenson, LJ such a comparison 
was possible, but existence with disability was almost always preferable to non-
 
Journal of Current Legal Issues 3 (2004), 
http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2004/issue3/gavaghan3.html (accessed on 09/02/2012); 
Kavka, G., ‘The paradox of future individuals’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 
(1981): 93–112; Roberts, M., Wasserman, D. (eds), Harming Future Persons: 
Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem, Dordrecht: Springer, 2009. 
82 This is in contrast to cases for wrongful conception or wrongful birth which are 
brought on behalf of parents and where the child may or may not have disabilities. 
See for example McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board [1999] 3 WLR 1301HL; 
Parkinson v. St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust [2001] 3 All 
ER 97 CA. 
83 McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority [1982] QB 1166 CA, at p. 1189. 
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existence.84 Despite this difference of approach, none of the judges had any real trouble 
in holding that wrongful life actions were inadmissible. Jackson suggests that Stephenson 
LJ’s judgment may be preferable ‘because it is …plainly not true that the courts are 
incapable of deciding that non-existence would be preferable to (or at least no worse 
than) existence, since this is precisely the assessment that has sometimes been made 
when authorising the non-treatment of very severely disabled neonates’ (Original 
emphasis).85 However, the courts have generally sought to avoid the philosophical 
conundrum of weighing the respective benefits of existence and non-existence by 
claiming that they are seeking to evaluate the burdens and benefits of treatment. In other 
words, they do not overtly conclude that a patient ‘would be better off dead’ since one of 
the consequences of doing so would be to invite the prospect of increased challenges to 
the current legal position that prevents active steps being taken with the primary intention 
of ending life, but allows doctors in some circumstances to fail to save or prolong life.86 
So for example in the case of Bland, involving an adult in a persistent vegetative state 
and where the best interests of the patient were considered to be the guiding principle, it 
was said by Lord Goff that: 
 
[T]he question is not whether it is in the best interests of the patient that he should 
die. The question is whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his life 
should be prolonged by the continuance of this form of medical treatment or 
care.87 
 
Similarly in the case of Re A (conjoined twins) (2000), involving the proposed surgical 
separation of twin girls Mary and Jodie. Ward LJ, representing the majority of the court, 
84 Ibid., at p. 1182. 
85 Jackson, ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’, at 196. 
86 See for example Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821, Fam D, CA and 
HL. 
87 Ibid., per Keith LJ, at p. 869. 
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considered Mary’s profound disabilities and incapacity to survive independently in this 
way: 
 
Given the international Conventions protecting the ‘right to life’… I conclude that 
it is impermissible to deny that every life has an equal inherent value. Life is 
worthwhile in itself whatever the diminution in one’s capacity to enjoy 
it…Mary’s life, desperate as it is, still has its own ineliminable value and 
dignity.88 
 
Despite such seemingly strong support for the merits of existence, whatever its 
condition, the court concluded that the separation could be performed. The situation of 
conjoined twins poses special difficulties, due to the need to consider the effect of the 
same treatment upon the best interests of two children, and the impossibility of both of 
their interests being regarded as paramount if they are in conflict. The judicial reasoning 
employed to arrive at the court’s conclusion has been criticised on a number of cogent 
grounds.89 However, it highlights the fact that deeming non-existence preferable to 
existence is not an approach that has been explicitly endorsed as an appropriate guiding 
principle for the judiciary, though it is hard not to see this kind of calculation as playing 
at least some part in assessments in fact. 
 
Section 13(5) requires that an assessment of the welfare of an as yet unconceived 
child must take place, by asking treatment centres to consider the possible future for a 
child resulting from treatment. One option would be for them, like Ackner, LJ in McKay, 
88 Re A (children) (conjoined twins: surgical separation) [2000] 4 All ER 961 CA, at p. 
1002. 
89 See for example Clucas, B., O’Donnell, K., ‘Conjoined twins: the cutting edge’, Web 
JCLI 5 (2002); Harris, J., ‘Human beings, persons and conjoined twins: an ethical 
analysis of the judgment in Re A’, Medical Law Review 9(3) (2001): 221–36; 
Huxatable, R., ‘Logical separation? Conjoined twins, slippery slopes and resource 
allocation’, Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 23(4) (2001): 459–71. 
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to conclude that a comparison of existence with non-existence is simply not possible. If 
this were the extent of the consideration that a centre was bound to give, it would appear 
to follow that no harm to the resulting child could be demonstrated and treatment could 
never be refused on this basis.90 As Gavaghan points out, ‘since it is presumably unlikely 
that parliamentary intent was that such a consideration should have no bearing on the 
decision whether to provide treatment, it seems obvious that the intention was that certain 
welfare considerations would lead to the refusal of such treatment’.91 As he goes on to 
explain, it was contemplated that  ‘in certain circumstances, it is foreseeably in the 
interests of a potential future child to be spared existence’, or that the balance of harms 
and benefits in its life are such that ‘its life would constitute a harm “on balance”’.92  
 
In other words, what appears to be intended by s. 13(5), at least where the medical 
condition of the child is concerned, is an approach that is more akin to Stephenson, LJ in 
McKay, taking the view that there are some conditions in which life would be thought to 
provide such little opportunity for enjoyment of any interests that it would be preferable 
to avoid the foreseeable suffering of a child, in this case by avoiding its conception.93 
Furthermore, despite the courts’ evident reluctance to enter into such assessments in 
90 Authors differ on whether a child in such circumstances can be described as being 
harmed or wronged. See for example Feinberg, J., Harm to Others Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1984, at pp. 97–104; Feinburg, J., ‘Wrongful life and the 
counterfactual element in harming’, Social Philosophy and Policy 4(1) (1986): 
145–78; Harris J., ‘The wrong of wrongful life’, Journal of Law and Society 17 
(1990): 90–105. 
91 Gavaghan, C., Defending the Genetic Supermarket, Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, at p. 
97. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Of course, s. 13(5) is not limited to welfare concerns relating to conditions likely to 
have health implications for the child. It extends to factors such as parenting 
environment, which creates additional difficulties in determining in what 
circumstances assisted reproduction treatment should be denied. 
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wrongful life claims, their approach has been suggested to be somewhat disingenuous 
when compared with other areas of judicial consideration, for example in relation to 
claims involving wrongful death, where it is equally impossible to embark by personal 
experience on an assessment of the value of existence against non-existence.94 It also 
echoes the thinking in cases concerning withholding or withdrawing treatment, that 
existence is not always a sufficient benefit to outweigh all circumstances, although again, 
an explicit determination that a child or adult would be better off not existing is not the 
reason given for judgments.95 However, the threshold for restricting access to treatment 
under the HFE Acts has the potential to be set rather lower than would be expected where 
decisions concern the treatment of living patients, as illustrated by the examples of 
congenital deafness and the single copy gene mutation for achondroplasia. These are 
conditions that meet the criteria for seriousness that would permit testing using PGD, and 
hence engage the provisions prohibiting preferential selection, but that might be thought 
to fall short of the kinds of expectations of extreme suffering and lack of opportunity for 
positive experiences that have formed the basis of consideration in the treatment of 
seriously ill or disabled children. Here, although the criteria of the child’s life being 
‘intolerable’ or that it would be ‘demonstrably so awful’ that continued treatment should 
not be provided have been dismissed as being separate from the test of best interests, such 
notions are still regarded as ‘a valuable guide in the search for best interests in this kind 
of case’.96 By contrast, the guidance offered on interpreting the welfare test offered by 
the HFEA in respect of health implications for a child suggests only that clinics shou
consider whether ‘any child who may be born is likely to suffer from a serious medical 
condition’ or ‘circumstances that the centre considers likely to cause serious harm to any 
child’.97 
 
94 Gavaghan, Defending the Genetic Supermarket, at p. 97.  
95 Jackson, ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’. 
96 Portsmouth Hospital NHS Trust v. Wyatt [2004] EWCA 2247 Fam D, per Hedley J., at 
para. 24. 
97 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice. 
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The difficulty for parents seeking to use affected embryos is that if the genetic 
abnormalities the embryos have are the ones which PGD was undertaken to detect, then 
the condition must already have passed a threshold of seriousness, as there are restrictions 
on what kinds of condition can be tested for. As Jackson discusses elsewhere in this 
volume,98 there is a two-tier consideration of whether PGD can be offered to a couple: 
first the HFEA must consider whether the condition itself meets the test of ‘seriousness’: 
it has to be satisfied that there is a substantial risk of a serious condition before a licence 
for testing of this condition can be issued.99 This criterion must be judged by objective, 
non-family-specific criteria. By contrast, treatment centres, before offering PGD to a 
couple, must apply individualised criteria to decide whether testing for this condition for 
this particular couple is appropriate. This is dealt with in the HFEA Code of Practice.100 
These criteria include the following: 
 
10.5 When deciding if it is appropriate to provide PGD in particular cases, the 
centre should consider the circumstances of those seeking treatment rather 
than the particular heritable condition. 
 
10.6 The use of PGD should be considered only where there is a significant risk 
of a serious genetic condition being present in the embryo. When deciding 
if it is appropriate to provide PGD in particular cases, the seriousness of 
the condition in that case should be discussed between the people seeking 
treatment and the clinical team. The perception of the level of risk for 
those seeking treatment will also be an important factor for the centre to 
consider. 
 
10.7 The centre should consider the following factors when deciding if PGD is 
appropriate in particular cases: 
98 See Chapter 4. 
99 Schedule 2 1ZA (2) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
100 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice, at 10.5–7. 
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(a) the views of the people seeking treatment in relation to the condition to 
be avoided, including their previous reproductive experience 
(b) the likely degree of suffering associated with the condition 
(c) the availability of effective therapy, now and in the future 
(d) the speed of degeneration in progressive disorders 
(e) the extent of any intellectual impairment  
(f) the social support available, and 
(g) the family circumstances of the people seeking treatment. 
 
However, the attention paid to the views of the couple and their particular 
circumstances is not repeated in the Code of Practice where what is at issue is making a 
decision whether to use an affected embryo. The guidance here is couched solely in terms 
of reference to the welfare of the child provision.101 Presumably, however, the couple’s 
circumstances and reasons for seeking to use an affected embryo would be significant 
factors and, as will be discussed further, the welfare of the child criterion is not 
determinative under s. 13(5) of the HFEA 1990, hence permitting other factors, such as 
these, to be taken into account. Once again it is critical to note that the prohibitions in the 
legislation under ss. 13(9–11) of the HFEA 1990 rest on ‘preferential’ selection of 
affected embryos. As a result, the restrictions on the use of affected embryos are less 
clear-cut than they might at first appear. As I have outlined, there is the possibility that a 
couple could be in the position where no unaffected embryos are available, either because 
all embryos in a batch are affected or, more controversially, where embryos have been 
created and tested serially so that the couple has chosen to be in a position of only having 
an affected embryo. If these provisions are based on welfare of the child considerations, it 
could be argued that the restriction on using affected embryos should not depend on the 
presence or absence of other embryos that the couple could use. The condition of a child 
born using an affected embryo would be the same regardless of whether the couple could 
potentially have another child using a different embryo. However, that is not the 
approach that has been taken, and no discretion is permitted to allow a couple who prefer 
101 HFEA, 8th Code of Practice, at 10.17–18. 
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to use an affected embryo to do so where an unaffected embryo is available.102 Welfare 
of the child concerns here appears definitively to trump any consideration of the views o
circumstances of intending parents. They do not where the only embryo that a couple can 
use is one affected by a genetic disorder. Whether this is an appropriate response depends 
very much on the perception of the role of parental views on the kinds of children the 
couple feels willing and able to parent and the context in which such parental views are 
formed.103 As such, it engages questions of reproductive decision-making, which will be 
considered in the next section. 
 
Nevertheless, whether a treatment centre would obtain the approval of a clinical 
ethics committee and be prepared to exercise its discretion to enable affected embryos to 
be used in an individual case remains a matter of conjecture. 
 
Reproductive choice 
 
In Western societies, autonomy and privacy have been recognised as fundamental ethical 
principles and are given significant legal protection, although not, it must be said, to the 
exclusion of all others. Nevertheless, generally included as part of this recognition is the 
area of reproductive decision-making, so that as a broad proposition it can be suggested 
that there is an expectation that matters concerning when and whether to have children 
are largely regarded as matters of individual choice. As Jackson notes, people who can 
102 Sections 13(9–11) HFEA 1990, as amended. 
103 See for example Krahn, T.M., ‘Regulating preimplantation genetic diagnosis: the case 
of Down’s syndrome’, Medical Law Review 19(2) (2011): 157–91; Gilbar, R. 
‘Between unconditional acceptance and responsibility: should family ethics limit 
the scope of reproductive autonomy?’, Child and Family Law Quarterly 21(3) 
(2009): 309–35. 
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conceive children without medical assistance can do so ‘without any external scrutiny of 
the merit or otherwise of their decision’.104  
 
However, although we may live in a time in which the notion of individual rights 
is pervasive, the extent to which reproductive rights exist and may be enforced is by no 
means uncontentious. As Brazier suggests: 
 
Few might dissent from a rhetorical assertion that men and women have a right to 
found a family. Begin to debate what that right entails and who enjoys it and 
dispute resurfaces.105 
 
The reasons that have been put forward for claiming that there is a presumption of 
non-interference in decisions about founding a family are various.106 Robertson, for 
example, has described it as follows: 
 
The moral right to reproduce is respected because of the centrality of reproduction 
to personal identity, meaning and dignity…Because of this importance the right to 
reproduce is widely recognised as a prima facie moral right that cannot be limited 
except for very good reason.107 
104 Jackson, ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’, at 177. Even so, 
they may not be exclusively matters for the individual so that, for example, the 
criminal law has a role to play in matters such as abortion, incest and the legal age 
of consent to sexual intercourse. 
105 Brazier, M., ‘Regulating the reproductive business?’, Medical Law Review 7 (1999): 
166–93, at 168.  
106 For more detailed discussion, see for example N. Priaulx, ‘Rethinking progenitive 
conflict: why reproductive autonomy matters’, Medical Law Review 16(2) (2008): 
169–200. 
107 Robertson, J., Children of Choice, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, at 
p. 30. 
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For others, such as Jackson, this right is grounded more specifically on two 
different aspects of privacy: 
 
First, that interfering with a particular individual’s decision to conceive a child 
would usually involve violating their bodily integrity and sexual privacy. The 
second and I would argue equally important reason for respecting people’s 
conception choices is that the freedom to decide for oneself whether or not to 
reproduce is integral to a person’s sense of being, in some important sense, the 
author of their own life plan.108 
 
Authors such as Laing and Oderberg on the other hand suggest that autonomy and 
decisional privacy should not be regarded as trump cards where reproductive decisions 
are concerned. They argue that: 
 
a proper evaluation of AR [assisted reproduction] and of the relevance of welfare 
will be sensitive not only to the rights of ‘commissioning parties’ to AR but also 
to public policy considerations. We argue that AR has implications for the 
common good, by involving matters of human reproduction, kinship, race, 
parenthood and identity.109 
 
The thrust of their argument is directed at the use of assisted reproduction in itself 
as a means of creating children and suggests a number of grounds to support restrictions 
on individual choice, welfare of resulting children being one of them. However, even 
they concede that ‘There are legitimate general principles against state interference in 
108 Jackson, ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’, at 177. 
109 Laing, J.A., Oderberg, D.S., ‘Artificial reproduction, the “welfare principle”, and the 
common good’, Medical Law Review 13(3) (2005): 328–56, at 328. 
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reproductive decision-making; these derive both from anti-eugenicist considerations’ and 
from human rights principles.110 
 
The importance of reproductive decision-making may seem to be protected by the 
human rights principles contained in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, particularly in Article 12, the right to marry and to found a 
family and Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, although as UK case 
law, such as Evans and Briody demonstrate, these rights are by no means absolute.111  
 
It can be suggested that what is really being protected by the ECHR is a negative 
right, a liberty, to seek to found a family without outside interference, but that it does not 
go so far as to accord a positive right: a right to assistance. This kind of thinking was 
clearly evident in the judgment of Hale, LJ in the case of Briody, concerning whether 
there could be an award of damages to enable a surrogacy arrangement to be undertaken: 
 
While everyone has the right to try to have their own children by natural means, 
no-one has the right to be provided with a child.112 
 
The reasons for regarding reproductive choice as only a liberty are diverse but, 
along with the kinds of public interest and human dignity concerns referred to by Laing 
and Oderberg, include the recognition that to do otherwise might be to commit the state 
to furnishing the means of reproduction if they were not available otherwise to the 
individual or couple: a commitment that could not be fulfilled without significant 
material, technical and financial resources. Nevertheless, even if this more limited 
110 Ibid., at 330. 
111 Evans v. Amicus Healthcare [2004] EWCA Civ 727, [2004] 2 All ER 309 (HL), 
Briody v. St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority (Claim for Damages and 
Costs) (2001) 62 BMLR 1 CA. 
112 Briody v. St Helens and Knowsley Area Health Authority (Claim for Damages and 
Costs) (2001) 62 BMLR 1 CA, para. 26. 
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approach is adopted, there remains the question whether the regulation of an available 
means of founding a family, such as assisted reproduction, can be seen as an acceptable 
restriction on the liberty of individuals. After all, it could be argued that the restrictions 
on the provision of treatment services in the HFE Acts interfere with the possible choices 
of the medically infertile, those whose social circumstances lead them to seek to use 
assisted reproductive techniques, or those who for medical reasons wish to use IVF and 
embryo testing in order to make certain choices regarding the genetic make-up of any 
child they will have. As such, this may in itself be regarded as a restriction on 
reproductive liberty.113 
 
So far the approach that has been taken both by British courts and by the 
European Court of Human Rights has been to allow such restrictions to be imposed in 
principle without much comment, although the nature of particular restrictions may still 
need to be justified. So in the case of Briody, it was said in relation to the Article 12 right 
in the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that: 
 
The right to marry and found a family are freedoms which should not be 
arbitrarily restricted, for example by preventing prisoners from marrying; this 
may well preclude placing arbitrary or disproportionate restrictions upon access to 
the reproductive services which are generally available. But that is quite different 
from having a right to be supplied with a child (or a spouse).114  
 
Similarly, in the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Dickson, restrictions 
imposed by the Secretary of State on access to assisted reproduction by a prisoner and his 
wife were said to be disproportionate to the legitimate aims of the state when dealing 
113 Discussed in Jackson, ‘Conception and the irrelevance of the welfare principle’, at 
184–5. 
114 Briody v. St Helens & Knowsley AHA (Claim for Damages and Costs) (2001) 62 
BMLR 1 CA, per LJ Hale, para. 26. 
181 
                                                
with offenders.115 Although specifically concerned with the right to access IVF treatment 
during imprisonment, the case contains some interesting comments on the extent to 
which restrictions may be imposed. It was held by the majority of the European Court of 
Human Rights that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms was engaged, in that the complainants’ right to respect for their 
private and family lives incorporated rights to respect for their decision to become 
genetic parents. Prisoners retained Convention rights on imprisonment and any 
restrictions must be justified in each case; such justification could not be based solely on 
what would offend public opinion. However, in respect of welfare of the child concerns it 
was said that: 
 
The Court is prepared to accept as legitimate, for the purposes of the second 
paragraph of Article 8, that the authorities, when developing and applying the 
Policy, should concern themselves, as a matter of principle, with the welfare of 
any child: conception of a child was the very object of the exercise. Moreover, the 
State has a positive obligation to ensure the effective protection of children.116 
 
However, it went on to say that the state could not go so far as to prevent parents 
from conceiving a child in these circumstances. UK policy was held to have placed an 
inordinately high burden on the complainants to demonstrate that deprivation of the 
opportunity to undertake assisted reproduction might prevent conception altogether, and 
that their circumstances were ‘exceptional’. That did not allow a balancing of competing 
individual and public interests, nor a proportionality test to be applied, as required by the 
Convention. The policy was not embodied in primary legislation, competing interests had 
never been weighed, and the issues of proportionality had never been assessed by 
Parliament.117 In the absence of such an assessment, the policy was seen as falling 
115 Dickson v. UK (ECHR 2007) (Application no. 44362/04). 
116 Ibid., para. 76. 
117 Ibid., paras. 77–85. 
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outside any acceptable margin of appreciation. The complainants were awarded €5,000 
by way of damages for frustration and
 
Nevertheless, the general principle that a regulatory framework may be imposed 
on assisted reproduction services has so not far been successfully challenged in the 
EctHR, and there are those who have doubts about the utility of human rights principles 
as a means of protecting people’s choices in assisted reproduction.118 Furthermore, 
whether people should have a right not only to choose to try to have children, but to 
attempt to determine the characteristics of their children, adds another dimension to the 
meaning and scope of decisions concerning reproduction. As Robertson puts it: 
 
[c]hoices about who may conceive, bear or rear a child are distinct from choices 
about the conduct that occurs in the process of conceiving, bearing and rearing. In 
other words, arguably, the freedom to procreate is [would be] distinct from the 
freedom in procreation.119 [original emphasis] 
 
As has been made clear, one of the principal grounds for refusing treatment using 
embryos tested and discovered to have specific genetic conditions is the welfare of the 
child. It is implicit in the HFEA 1990, ss. 13(9–11) conditions and it appears to have been 
given overriding importance where what is at issue is the preferential selection of an 
affected embryo. However, somewhat paradoxically, where the child welfare principle is 
explicitly set out, in s. 13(5), it is not stated to be of paramount importance: it is a matter 
only that must be taken into account by treatment centres. While one of the major factors 
to be considered in the welfare assessment is undoubtedly the medical condition of a 
child resulting from treatment covered by the HFE Acts, the approach taken by s. 13(5) 
118 See for example Eijkholt, M., ‘The right to found a family as a stillborn right to 
procreate?’, Medical Law Review 18(2) (2010): 127–51. 
119 Robertson, J.A., ‘Procreative liberty and the control of conception, pregnancy, and 
childbirth’, Virginia Law Review 69 (1983): 405–65, at 410. 
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does allow other factors, such as the views and circumstances of couples, and more 
broadly, their reproductive freedom, to be weighed against it. 
 
One possible argument suggests that depriving people of the ability to choose to 
have children with genetic abnormalities is permissible as this is simply not the kind of 
reproductive choice that should be protected. For example, Harris has stated that ‘it is 
wrong to bring avoidable suffering into the world’.120 Two widely accepted ethical 
principles are those of beneficence (to do good) and non-maleficence (to avoid causing 
harm). In the 1970s, Beauchamp and Childress popularised an approach combining these 
with respect for autonomy and justice, which went on to strongly influence healthcare 
ethics.121 While the ‘four principles’ approach they championed has been subjected 
increasingly to a more critical evaluation,122 nevertheless the importance of a desire to do 
good and avoid harm as general touchstones for ethical behaviour must surely remain. 
Difficulties inevitably arise, however, in the application of such principles in practice, 
such as in making decisions about the kinds of children one should seek to have.  
 
In the context of human reproduction, Savulescu has described a principle of 
‘procreative beneficence’ as follows: ‘couples…should select the child, of the possible 
children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as 
120 Harris, J., ‘Is there a coherent social concept of disability?’, Journal of Medical Ethics 
26 (2000): 95–100, at 96. 
121 This approach was popularised by Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F., Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, 6th edn, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. See for 
example Gillon, R., ‘Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope’, 
British Medical Journal 309(6948) (1994): 184–8. 
122 See for example Campbell, A., ‘The virtues (and vices) of the four principles’, Journal 
of Medical Ethics 29 (2003): 292–6; Walker, T., ‘What principlism misses’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (2009): 229–31.  
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the others’.123 While making some concessions to the degree of prediction that is possible 
he concludes ‘Even if we cannot know the value of a whole life, we can know that 
conditions are good or bad, and this provides a reason to prefer to bring children into 
existence without those conditions’.124 Nevertheless, he also makes a substantial 
limitation on his argument, saying ‘If, in the end, couples wish to select a child who will 
have a lower chance of having the best life, they should be free to make such a choice’.125 
He therefore ultimately places a higher priority on respecting the wishes of prospective 
parents in respect of their reproductive choices than on protecting the welfare of the child 
that might be born. He distinguishes between what might be a virtuous argument and 
what should be a legal restriction. This is an important distinction. In a similar vein, the 
HCSTC considered that ‘Even strong ethical arguments that there should be constraints 
on reproductive choice do not necessarily mean that legislation should provide that 
check’ and quoted with approval a line from a contributor to their on-line consultation 
‘there is an important difference between disapproving and disallowing’.126  
 
There may be some conditions for which it is difficult to argue that positive 
experiences for a child outweigh negative ones. One often used example is that of Tay–
Sachs, a genetic disorder which causes death in early childhood, preceded by increasingly 
debilitating and distressing physical and mental decline, and for which there is no cure.127 
Other conditions, however, will inevitably be much more contentious. As Scott explains: 
123 Savulescu, J., ‘Procreative beneficence: why we should select the best children’, 
Bioethics 15 (2001): 413–26, at 415.   
124 Savulescu, J., ‘In defence of procreative beneficence’, Journal of Medical Ethics 33 
(2007): 284–8, at 284. 
125 Savulescu, ‘Procreative beneficence’, at 425. 
126 HCSTC, Fifth Report of Session 2004–5, Human Reproductive Technologies and the 
Law, vol.1, para. 112 
127 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS), Tay–Sachs disease 
information page, www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/taysachs/taysachs.htm (accessed 
on 11/11/2011). 
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as we move away from the extreme and rare case, judging seriousness is very 
difficult. It is made more complex by the potentially competing perspectives – 
parental, medical and those of the impaired – on this issue.128 
 
She goes on to say: 
 
In some cases, although a possible child may have the prospect of a reasonable quality of 
life, his impairments may still implicate his parents’ interests in reproduction in serious 
ways; he might have a significant mental impairment or serious health problems requiring 
repeated hospitalisation with an uncertain future.129 
 
Her discussion concerns whether parents should be able to seek PGD, in terms of 
the assessment of a condition being serious enough to merit testing and the consequent 
rejection of embryos found to have it. However, it is also applicable to the situation 
where a couple seeks to use embryos that have been tested and found to have genetic 
disorders or to be at risk of developing particular medical conditions. Here too the rights 
and interests of the couple are engaged along with those of a future child. Balancing these 
potentially competing considerations raises profound questions about legitimate 
boundaries upon reproductive decision-making. Scott’s conclusion is that ‘in cases of 
reasonable disagreement about seriousness, parental views and interests should carry the 
most weight’.130 Of course the immediate difficulties return – what is a ‘reasonable 
quality of life’ or ‘reasonable disagreement about seriousness’? In cases where agreement 
cannot be reached between couples and treatment providers over the proposed use of 
128 Scott, R., ‘Choosing between possible lives: legal and ethical issues in preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26(1) (2006): 153–78, at 164. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. This argument is made in more detail in Scott, R., ‘Prenatal screening, autonomy 
and reasons: the relationship between the law of abortion and wrongful life’, 
Medical Law Review 11(3) (2003): 265–325. 
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affected embryos, resort may be had to the courts in an attempt to resolve them. The 
likelihood of success for couples may, however, be limited.131 The issue remains, 
however, that no concession is made to considerations of reproductive autonomy for a 
couple that wishes to use an affected embryo rather than an unaffected one, where the 
couple has both available. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Questions have been raised about the suitability and applicability of a welfare of the child 
standard where what is under consideration is the possible conception of a child rather 
than the welfare of a child who has been born. Although there are some circumstances in 
which it might be argued that a future child’s life would have so few redeeming features 
that it might be considered better to avoid this by not seeking to implant an affected 
embryo, the extent to which this would be true in many cases is a matter about which 
opinions may differ sharply. Where certain conditions, such as congenital deafness or 
achondroplasia are concerned the scope for interference with potential parental choice 
becomes particularly troubling. The application of the welfare principle to the selection 
of embryos is undoubtedly problematic, but interpreting it in the only way that is 
practicable still leaves room to suggest that overriding the views of potential parents on 
the basis of child welfare, where they wish to proceed with treatment using affected 
embryos, should be undertaken with extreme caution.  
 
The clear intention of the amendment of the treatment licensing provisions of the 
HFEA 1990 was to prevent potential parents from exercising a choice to select for 
disability. As a result, there is now no discretion to allow a couple to choose to use an 
affected embryo where there is at least one unaffected embryo available. Despite this, 
131 See for example, the discussion in Bell, ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
2008’, Web JCLI 1 [2009], http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2009/issue1/bell1.html 
(accessed on 09/02/2012). 
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there is in fact no absolute prohibition on using an affected embryo for treatment if there 
is no unaffected embryo that could be used instead. This may apply even where a couple 
has deliberately sought to engineer the situation by serial creation and testing of embryos, 
so as to circumvent the provisions on preferential selection in ss. 13(9–11) of the HFEA 
1990. However, the use of any embryo for treatment remains subject to the overarching 
principle of child welfare set out in s. 13(5) HFEA 1990, as amended. Given that this is 
the case, there are reasons to doubt whether the inclusion of the embryo selection 
restrictions was strictly necessary if, as seems, clear the justification for the more specific 
provisions is also child welfare. Simply relying on s. 13(5) would have allowed discretion 
to be exercised in respect of the use of a particular embryo, regardless of the availability 
of other embryos that the couple could use. That would in many ways appear to be a 
more logical approach to have taken, since the welfare of a particular child, judged on its 
genetic condition, is not usually dependent on the absence or presence of alternative 
children that a couple could have.132 Welfare decisions could therefore have been made 
on a case by case basis where any couple sought to use an embryo which had a genetic 
condition placing it at risk of, or with a certainty of developing, a serious medical 
condition. Such decisions might well have remained contentious and the application of 
the welfare principle no easier a task. Nevertheless, as it stands, discretion to allow the 
use of embryos has been curtailed absolutely in some situations. 
 
As such it may be concluded that the real effect of the new provisions is in the 
signals that it sends about the kind of decisions people should make where there is a 
possibility of having certain kinds of children. In fact, the aims of the legislation go 
further and deem certain choices unacceptable and hence prohibited. This brings into play 
what may be termed expressivist objections. The most common arguments based on 
expressivist grounds concern choices to select against disability. Here it has been 
132 An exception might be where a child has a genetic condition for which PGD might be 
used to create a ‘saviour sibling’ to provide material for donation. This however 
concerns the welfare of a born child rather than the welfare of the yet-to-be 
conceived child, which is at issue here. 
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contended that selection for reproductive purposes to avoid the conception or birth of 
people with disabling medical conditions can cause ‘offence and hurt to people currently 
living with the kinds of conditions screened for’.133 A frequent counter to such objections 
to PGD is that allowing people to have the choice to avoid having children with 
disabilities does not necessarily devalue people who have such disabilities.134 However, 
legislating that choices to have particular children are unacceptable, based on their 
predicted medical condition, may have more force in engendering these kinds of 
objections. A couple may wish to avoid having a child with physical or mental illness for 
many reasons, which do not necessarily imply a value judgement about people who have 
such conditions.135 However, for the law to provide that couples should not be able to 
choose to create a child with genetic abnormalities in some circumstances seems to come 
rather closer to a state endorsed view that certain kinds of lives are not worth living by 
mandating that the creation of such lives should be avoided, at least where other lives that 
would be considered to have greater opportunities could be brought into being. In doing 
so, it restricts reproductive freedom with the purported aim of child protection. If it is 
accepted that there are family circumstances which permit a couple legitimately to be 
permitted to seek to avoid having children with disabilities, it may be arguable that in 
some cases at least, having children with specific conditions that may be regarded as 
disabling would be a legitimate choice for the couple concerned. Notwithstanding the 
approach of the new legislation, there may be some scope for such preferences to be 
achieved, but the interpretation of child welfare based provisions, through the HFEA, 
treatment centres and clinical ethics committees, will be critical. The likelihood of such 
cases arising in practice may be small, but nevertheless they raise significant issues. 
133 Edwards, S.D. ‘Disability, identity and the “expressivist objection”’, Journal of 
Medical Ethics 30 (2004): 418–20, at 418. 
134 See for example Gavaghan, C., ‘Right problem wrong solution: a pro-choice response 
to “expressivist” concerns about preimplantation genetic diagnosis’, Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 16 (2007): 20–34; Edwards, ‘Disability, identity’. 
135 For a discussion of this issue see Gavaghan, Defending the Genetic Supermarket, at 
pp. 110–14. 
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